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1	BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, .
	. Case Number 22-cr-60
4	Plaintiff, .
5	vs. . Washington, D.C.
6	VINCENT GILLESPIE, . December 23, 2022 . 9:00 a.m.
7	Defendant
8	
9	TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BERYL A. HOWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11	APPEARANCES:
12	For the United States: JACQUELINE SCHESNOL, AUSA
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22	Official Court Reporter: SARA A. WICK, RPR, CRR 333 Constitution Avenue Northwest
23	Room 4704-B Washington, D.C. 20001
24	202-354-3284
25	Proceedings recorded by stenotype shorthand. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

PROCEEDINGS

(Call to order of the court.)

(Jury not present.)

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COURTROOM DEPUTY: Matter before the Court, Criminal Case Number 22-60, United States of America versus Vincent Gillespie.

Counsel, please come forward and state your names for the record, starting with the government.

MS. SCHESNOL: Good rainy morning, Your Honor.

Jacqueline Schesnol and Carolina Nevin representing the United

States. With us at counsel table, Shirine Rouhi and Ray Adams.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. WATKINS: Tim Watkins and Aziza Hawthorne and Forest O'Neill-Greenberg on behalf of Mr. Gillespie, who is with us here in court. Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Good morning.

All the jurors have arrived, and so I'm going to bring them in. Meanwhile, because the weather is unclear about precisely what's going to be happening today, I'm going to tell the jurors that we're going to be monitoring the weather and they may be required to leave early.

The question for you all is should I remind them that if before they leave they're ready to return verdicts on any of the charges, that they should do so?

I've alerted them to that on page 12 of the jury form given

to them where I said, "At any time during your deliberations, you may return your verdict of guilty or not guilty with respect to any count."

So I can tell them, you know -- I can remind them about that, that if before I excuse them they are ready to deliver verdicts on some counts, that they should do so.

MS. SCHESNOL: I think that's a good reminder, Your Honor. They might not remember that from the instructions.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. WATKINS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear Ms. Schesnol on that.

THE COURT: She has no objection.

MR. WATKINS: Your Honor, if we could have some time to think about it, and when that -- we're not going to instruct the jury this morning, I assume.

THE COURT: Oh, I was going to tell them right now.

MR. WATKINS: So what is the --

THE COURT: Because we may -- depending upon what happens with snow and sleet and who knows what's going to happen today, I may be excusing them by noon. I don't know.

MR. WATKINS: And by excusing them, instructing them to return back on Tuesday?

THE COURT: Well, that's another question, of when they're going to come back, which I haven't broached with you all. The Court is in recess next week.

MR. WATKINS: I understand.

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THE COURT: There will be only a skeletal crew here, zero cafeteria. So it will be difficult.

MR. WATKINS: May we have some time to think about the different scenarios, and perhaps if the Court --

THE COURT: How much time is it going to take you,

Mr. Watkins, to remind them about something I've already charged
them on?

MR. WATKINS: It's an unusual procedure, in my experience, that we would take a partial verdict. I understand that it is permissible, but it's unusual. I just had not thought that that might be something the Court would consider.

THE COURT: Well, before Christmas break and, you know, who knows what they're going to be exposed to, because this is a very heavy getting-together kind of thing weekend, I'm afraid we're going to lose jurors. COVID is so rampant right now. We've already lost one juror. I fear that we are not going to get a fully healthy jury back after this weekend.

MR. WATKINS: So it sounds like the Court is considering dismissing the jury after it delivers whatever verdict it's come to?

THE COURT: Absolutely not. I want them to return any verdict before I lose a jury on any charges they haven't returned. Mr. Watkins, this isn't that complicated.

Bring the jury in. I'm going to do this.

MR. WATKINS: Judge, at this point we are going to 1 2 object. THE COURT: To something they've already been charged 3 about? Really? That's an objection? 4 MR. WATKINS: Yes, I will object at this --5 6 THE COURT: Why? 7 MR. WATKINS: Judge, if you could just note our 8 objection for the record. The Court is clearly going to do what 9 it's going to do. So I'm not sure that there's anything I can 10 say that is going to convince the Court otherwise. 11 THE COURT: And my reasoning is clear, because they 12 need to be prepared for that, to leave early, if they think they're going to be here until 5:00 or 6:00. And when I do -- I 1.3 14 don't want to surprise them by saying, "Do you have a verdict?" 15 I want them to be thinking about that and focused on that. 16 My reasons are clear. You've given me zero reasons. 17 Bring them in. 18 (Jury entered courtroom.) 19 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 20 going to send you back to begin your deliberations again. 21 I know, as we are all aware, that the weather is a little 22 iffy today, to say the least. I do not know how long I'm going 23 to be keeping you for your deliberations today. We are 2.4 monitoring the weather.

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But let me remind you that if your deliberations are not

allowed to go as long as they did yesterday or at least even until 5:00 today because of the weather, I want to remind you of the instruction on page 12 of your jury instructions that says, "At any time during your deliberations, you may return your verdict of guilty or not guilty with respect to any count."

So if we break early, and I don't know what the most recent report is of when snow, freezing snow is going to start falling, potentially early this afternoon, I wanted you to be aware of that instruction so that when I call you back, if you're prepared to deliver a verdict on any count, you can do so at that time.

All right. You're all excused to return to your deliberations.

(Jury exited courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right. Stay tuned.

(Recess taken from 9:08 a.m. to 11:12 a.m.)

(Jury not present.)

THE COURT: Have the parties conferred about how they would like to respond to the most current note time-stamped today at 10:47 a.m.?

MR. WATKINS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last part.

THE COURT: Have the parties conferred on whether they agree on how to respond to the note time-stamped 10:47 a.m.?

MS. SCHESNOL: The government knows how it would respond. We have not had the chance to talk.

THE COURT: I usually like the parties to confer about jury notes, and then if both parties agree, then I don't have to resolve anything --

MS. SCHESNOL: Right.

THE COURT: -- if I agree. So why don't you confer. (Counsel conferred.)

THE COURT: Have the parties conferred?

MS. SCHESNOL: We have conferred, Your Honor.

With regard to the first two questions, which are really one question where there's a clarification, the government believes that the Court can either answer that -- well, the government believes it can be answered with a no. The defense would like Your Honor to reread to them -- to not say yes or no but to simply reread the definition that's in the jury instruction, "act of physical violence."

And then with regard to the question about emotional trauma, the parties agree that the answer to that is no.

And with regard to we're unanimous on three charges, should we send in these charges, the government believes that the answer to that is yes, and I believe the defense renews their objection.

THE COURT: Because you don't want them to return the partial verdict yet?

MR. WATKINS: Once again, Judge, I'm having trouble hearing.

THE COURT: You don't want them to return a partial verdict yet?

MR. WATKINS: I think at this point it's too early for them to -- there's no indication that they don't want to continue to deliberate at this point.

THE COURT: This is not a matter of stopping their deliberations, Mr. Watkins, if that was the predicate for this renewed motion for -- renewal of objection to partial coercive jury re-instruction.

Let me restate what I thought I was clear about this morning. We are in a situation where -- you're in Boston; we're in Washington, D.C. It rains too hard in Washington, D.C., everything stops. OPM has already declared today, so the record is clear, people don't have to come to work today. They're expecting icy conditions, below freezing, with freezing rain. And this is something in Boston -- I cannot even begin to tell you what happens in Washington with snow.

MR. WATKINS: I am aware, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We are not in Boston. This jury is coming in this morning concerned about the weather. I had to tell them I'm not going to keep you until 6:00 when it's dark, they're expecting below freezing temperatures, high winds. You could get frostbite if you're out more than ten minutes for people who are taking the train. I have to tell them we're not going to go until 6:00 tonight, we're going to end earlier.

I checked the record. I did not tell them we were going to stop at noon to rush them. I told them we were going to be monitoring the situation to make it clear to them their safety is paramount.

As a side note, I am concerned because I've had a deputy marshal here already get into a car accident.

MR. WATKINS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last part.

THE COURT: I've already had a deputy marshal get in a car accident and have severe injuries from a lot of rain last night. So I gave them that reassurance.

I am also concerned, if I release them early without any jury verdict in this case, they're going to leave, they're going to get transmitted COVID over the weekend, and when we resume next week, should we need to, I'm not going to have 12 jurors, having already lost one to COVID. So it might be imminent mistrial. Maybe we'll lose more. Maybe people would agree to continuing with 11 jurors, but what if we lose more. It starts making me very uncomfortable.

I want to have at least some results from this jury and this week's work on the record reflected in some decisions on some counts that they could reach without any rushing today but assurance that I was monitoring the weather. I never told them, unlike in your motion, that they were going to leave by noon.

There are other judges in the courthouse in the middle of jury proceedings who are terminating at a set time. I am not,

so as not to rush them.

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MR. WATKINS: So I --

THE COURT: And I don't think they're feeling rushed. They have already indicated they might want to come back next week. I don't know. We'll see. I'm very concerned about what will happen next week and whether we will get all 12 jurors.

So that's where we're at. With respect to -- I agree, actually, that this is a little early for them to be returning a verdict when this is a jury note. This is not me bringing them in to excuse them because it's snowing, the wind is 50 miles an hour, and it's subfreezing wind and wind chill for people who have to walk to the Metro. So I'm going to tell them to keep working on the charges rather than have them return any verdict that they've reached so far.

Okay. Now, back to the question in front of us before we bring the jury in.

MR. WATKINS: So it sounds like the only dispute is to question 1, whether they -- as the government wants the answer to the question as no or whether the Court rereads its instruction about the term "act of physical violence" and what that means, and we are asking the Court to simply re-instruct, as it did, what an act of physical violence means.

THE COURT: What it's indicating to me is that the next time I use this instruction, I'm going to say "the term act of physical violence mean any act involving, one, an assault

with intent to harm or injure or, two, other infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual or, three, damage to," because that's how this reads. I think that that's basically what they're confused about.

And you object to clarifying that other than by rereading this instruction?

MR. WATKINS: Yes. I think the instruction answers the question that the jury is having.

THE COURT: Unambiguously?

MR. WATKINS: Yes. I mean, the instruction appears clear to me, and perhaps the jury is simply not looking at it carefully enough.

THE COURT: And it is as unambiguous to you as it is to me in the way that I've just read it with one, two, three?

MR. WATKINS: Yes, it's as unambiguous as it's written now. We have a very educated jury, including, I believe, at least three attorneys on there. It does not seem that there is very much --

THE COURT: I think there's only one attorney on there, isn't there?

MS. SCHESNOL: I actually think there's two.

THE COURT: Okay. I lost count of one of them.

MR. WATKINS: There are some very educated jurors on there, and this is, I guess, a question of simple grammar. I think nothing more needs to be said. I think the Court can and

should simply instruct, "I'm going to refer you to page 10 of my jury instructions where it talks specifically about what constitutes bodily harm" -- or, I'm sorry, "physical violence."

THE COURT: And then "and does bodily harm include emotional trauma," you agree no?

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. As to question 1, what is your position?

You think -- let's divide these questions into question 1, does an act involving intent to harm also apply to infliction of bodily harm? Two, that is, does he need to have intended to commit bodily harm to be found guilty? And then three, and does bodily harm include emotional trauma?

And the government is proposing to answer question 1 no, question 2 essentially no, and question 3 no.

So what are you -- and you're proposing -- am I understanding that correctly?

MS. SCHESNOL: I don't want to speak for Mr. Watkins. I will try, but if I get it wrong, he should correct me. I think we're reading questions 1 and 2 together. Question 2 is almost a clarification of number 1. You're right, they are separate. There are four question marks on this piece of paper. But when they start the sentence "that is, does he need to have intended to commit bodily harm in order to be found guilty?" I'm reading that in conjunction with question 1.

The government certainly has no opposition to Your Honor rereading the definition of "act of physical violence" with the one, two, three you proposed, because between commas or lack thereof, the grammar does get a little confusing, clearly, because otherwise they wouldn't have a question.

MR. WATKINS: Perhaps the Court will be surprised to learn I concur with Ms. Schesnol that this is one question. But I do disagree. I don't think we need to teach the jury grammar. The jury instruction is the jury instruction, and it is unambiguous, I think as the Court recognizes.

THE COURT: Well, if everybody agrees that it's unambiguous, why, then, can't I reread the term -- the definition with inserting the one, two, and three to make it as unambiguous as it --

MS. SCHESNOL: I think it is ambiguous, and the one, two, three can help.

MR. WATKINS: Judge, we can speculate all that we want about what the jury is thinking about this question, and I don't think that moves the ball forward at all. The instruction is the instruction. The definition is the definition. I think simply directing the jury's attention that that is the instruction that's in the statute --

THE COURT: But do you understand that this is the whole purpose of a note?

MR. WATKINS: One more time. I'm sorry.

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THE COURT: This is the whole purpose of a note, when they're confused by some of the grammar or whatever in terms of the definition, and to clarify for the jury that the term "act of physical violence" means any act involving, one, an assault with intent to harm or injure or, two, other infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual or, three, damage to or destruction of real or personal property seems like -- you agree that's an unambiguous reading of the definition. That's the correct understanding of the definition. They are asking for that clarification.

And I don't -- other than not answering the jury's question by simply reading the definition to them again without the one, two, or three makes little sense to me, Mr. Watkins, when we all agree that that's the correct reading of the definition, and it would be easy to give them a clarification.

So I'm not -- other than you taking the strategic chance that their confusion will lead them to an incorrect reading of the term "act of physical violence," I'm not sure I really understand why I couldn't answer, then, what I've marked as one and two to make sure I'm answering fully what they're asking for but taking one and two together as I've defined them and giving them that clarification in the definition. I'm not sure if it's anything other than a strategic reason.

MR. WATKINS: It relies on the language of the statute. The remedy is to call up Congress and say perhaps you

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should have drafted this differently. But that's not where we are. The definition is the definition in the statute, and I would suggest to add anything just invites mischief here.

MS. SCHESNOL: Just to be clear, Your Honor, the statute and the way it's worded in the superseding indictment, document 18 on the docket, is it talks about knowingly engage in any act of physical violence on a person or property. And then the jury instruction goes beyond that by defining what "act of physical violence" means.

So I agree with the Court that it would help clarify for the jury, who clearly is confused, by adding the one, two, and three.

THE COURT: Mr. Watkins, that's why we were both looking at the statute. I didn't know that there was a definition of "act of physical violence" in the statute, and I don't see one.

So were you referring to something I'm missing?

MR. WATKINS: I'm trying to look up the statute Standing here now, I don't know how that -- the language that's in the jury instruction came to be. It does not sound like case law related.

THE COURT: Probably some wise judges before us.

MS. SCHESNOL: Or not so wise, because the lack of commas is what I think is leading to the confusion.

THE COURT: Yeah, there is no definition in the

statute. So this definition was derived from a pattern jury instruction.

In any event, you all are reading the first two questions together, and I actually read the question, "That is, does he need to have intended to commit bodily harm to be found guilty?" to be somewhat different. And I think they're asking about the intent requirement. And so what they're really asking is, when he knowingly -- if he knowingly engaged in the act of physical violence that involved the infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual, does he need to have intended to commit that. And I think the answer to that is no.

But that's not how you all are reading that question, as I understand it.

MS. SCHESNOL: Well, I agree that the answer to that is no, and it is technically two questions. It almost seems like the second question is to clarify their first question.

So perhaps, Your Honor --

THE COURT: They're looking for the intent requirement, where you're not -- they're looking as to okay, if there's an assault with intent to harm or injure, does that intent requirement also follow through to infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual.

MR. WATKINS: Once again, Judge, I'm having a little trouble hearing you.

THE COURT: As I read their question, they're wanting

to know whether in the first prong of the definition, which 1 2 requires an intent to harm or injure in connection with an 3 assault, the crux of their question is whether there needs to be an intent requirement to inflict bodily harm. That's the crux 4 5 of their question. 6 MS. SCHESNOL: And we believe the answer to that is 7 no, since there are multiple ways that acts of physical violence is defined. 8 9 THE COURT: And would you agree with that, 10 Mr. Watkins? 11 MR. WATKINS: And I think the remedy there is to read 12 the --1.3 THE COURT: Yes or no, do you agree with that, 14 Mr. Watkins? 15 MR. WATKINS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: So if they had simply not asked question 1, if they had simply asked what I'm viewing as question 2, 17 18 "Does he need to have intended to commit bodily harm to be found 19 quilty?" I think the answer would be no. 20 MS. SCHESNOL: The government agrees. 21 THE COURT: And I think Mr. Watkins would agree. 22 MR. WATKINS: No. I think the better course, given 23 the totality --

THE COURT: No, as a matter of law, the answer is no.

As a strategic matter, I understand you want me just to read the

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definition. But as a matter of law, do you agree that the answer to the question, "Does he need to have intended to commit bodily harm to be found guilty?" the answer is no? I thought you just agreed.

MR. WATKINS: The instruction is "assault with intent to harm or injure or other infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual." So that is one way by which a person can be found guilty. How can we say no and not be more confusing about it?

THE COURT: Because it's an assault with intent to harm or injure or without the intent to harm or injure other infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual. That is the correct construction, I think, of the definition. I think you would agree with that, that's the unambiguous meaning of the definition.

MS. SCHESNOL: And then the third way is damage or destruction of property. So the answer is no, because there's three ways.

THE COURT: I appreciate the defense objection to doing anything other than rereading the definition. I am going to provide the clarification that I believe the jury is requesting. And looking at these three questions separately, "Does an act involving intent to harm also apply to infliction of bodily harm?" I could just answer that no and forget the "that is" and then turn to, "Does bodily harm include

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emotional trauma?" and answer that no and just leave out question number 2.

MR. WATKINS: Just leave out what? I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Their question number 2 and deal with it all as one question, as you both seem to propose. And perhaps that will clarify the definition for them.

MS. SCHESNOL: So in an effort to make it very clear to the jury, if the definition of "act of physical violence" is read to them with the one, two, three clarification, it is appropriate to then say --

THE COURT: Well, I was not going to do that. I was just going to say -- they've asked the question, "Does an act involving intent to harm also apply to infliction of bodily harm?" The answer is no. And then their second question is, "Does bodily harm include emotional trauma?" The answer is no. And with respect to the question about submitting their decisions on charges, not yet. And leave it at that.

How about that?

MS. SCHESNOL: All that being said, the government certainly does not oppose reading the act of physical violence with the one, two, three that hopefully would help clarify for the jury.

MR. WATKINS: And if it's not already clear, the defense's position is the Court should simply read that paragraph and instruct the jury that that is the law that

1 applies in the case.

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May I be heard just briefly on question 3? Would the Court consider telling the jury at this point we have monitored the weather, you're free to continue to deliberate as long as you wish this afternoon?

THE COURT: And what if it starts snowing and the temperature drops at 2:00 to below freezing? Will I just -- I think I've told them we're continuing to monitor the weather and so far so good.

How about that?

MR. WATKINS: Judge, as far as the weather, it is clearing outside. I think when we were walking over here, it's almost completely clear. I will say to the Court, it is bitterly cold and that, indeed, we see --

THE COURT: Is it below freezing yet?

MR. WATKINS: It is below freezing, and the sidewalks have been treated nearly everywhere that we walked between the Federal Defender Office here and the courthouse. And I think that is what the jurors are going to see when they leave --

THE COURT: They have a window in the jury room. They have an idea of what the weather is like.

MR. WATKINS: So I think that's something the Court could say, we monitor and perhaps as the jury has out the window --

THE COURT: And I think I will just say we're

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continuing to monitor the weather, so far so good, so continue deliberations. I'll just say that.

Okay. Let's bring the jury in.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: The jurors have asked for two minutes because they're in the middle of a discussion. They also have their -- they have their lunch?

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Not yet.

THE COURT: And with respect to defendant's renewal of objection to partial coercive jury instruction, is there anything you're asking me to do in this?

MR. WATKINS: No. The Court asked for some of the reasons, and I was asking for more time.

THE COURT: Oh, I see. So there's nothing to be done about that.

(Jury entered courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I've received your note time-stamped 10:47 a.m., which has one question with a little bit of a subpart, but if I answer the main part of the question, I don't think I have to address the second part, and a second question.

With respect to your first question, "Does an act involving intent to harm also apply to infliction of bodily harm?" the answer is no. And with respect to your next question, "And does bodily harm include emotional trauma?" the answer is no.

With respect to your update about having reached unanimity on some charges, let me just tell you, we're continuing to monitor the weather. It's gotten colder out, but so far, so good. I think everything's looking good outside. So you should just continue your deliberations.

JUROR: If you could repeat that first part of the very beginning.

THE COURT: Of the very beginning? With respect to the question?

JUROR: Right.

THE COURT: The question, "Does an act involving intent to harm also apply to infliction of bodily harm?" And the answer is no. And you did have a subpart to your question, but having answered your first question, I don't think I need to address the subpart.

All right. So you may return to your deliberations.

(Jury exited courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WATKINS: Just out of an abundance of caution, could you please note our objection to the Court answering the first question "no"?

THE COURT: I think you've made your objection.

MR. WATKINS: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Recess taken from 11:46 a.m. to 2:06 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Have the parties conferred

about how they would like to address this note?

MS. SCHESNOL: We have conferred, Your Honor, and we believe that if we put it on the record, ask the jury if they believe that no further deliberation could render a verdict on any of the outstanding four counts and we put that on the record, then that's where we're at.

THE COURT: Because the situation is I can either give the *Thomas* anti-deadlock or not. I mean, despite all my best efforts to tell them not to tell me the number, it's clearly one holdout. So it makes it -- well, Mr. Watkins?

MR. WATKINS: We concur.

THE COURT: Okay. So what I will do is I will -- just so we are all clear so we understand what's going on, I'm going to ask who speaks for the jury, who is the foreperson. I think it's number 8; right? Number 8, and just say we've received your note, is it your view that no further deliberations will reach a resolution, guilty or not guilty, on the open counts. If she says yes, I'm going to ask her then just to proceed to deliver the verdicts.

MR. WATKINS: Can you --

THE COURT: I said, and if she says yes, no further deliberations will help, I'm just going to ask her to deliver the verdict on the counts that they have reached a unanimous decision on. That's what the parties are requesting, as I understand it.

MS. SCHESNOL: I think that's the correct way to 1 2 proceed. 3 THE COURT: And no anti-deadlock? MR. WATKINS: No. 4 THE COURT: I agree. 5 6 Let's bring the jury in. 7 And do you want the jury polled? 8 MR. WATKINS: Yes, please. 9 (Jury entered courtroom.) 10 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I've received your 11 note time-stamped 1:26 p.m. today, which states that "there is 12 an update on our progress, and we have unanimous agreement on four counts." 1.3 14 Sorry. I'm going to start over again. Sorry. 15 I've received the note time-stamped 1:26 p.m., stating, "An 16 update on our progress," and the jury indicates that, and I 17 quote, we have unanimous agreement on four counts and that the 18 jury is deadlocked on four other counts and that the jury has 19 deliberated and, I quote, deliberated and redeliberated many 20 times. 21 So let me begin by asking, who speaks as the foreperson of 22 the jury? All right. Could the foreperson stand? 23 And is it the foreperson's view -- give her the 2.4 microphone -- having participated in the deliberations, that any

further deliberations by the jury on the counts for which the

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jury has been unable to reach a unanimous agreement would be fruitless?

JURY FOREPERSON: I believe that any further deliberation on the counts where we're not unanimous would be fruitless.

THE COURT: All right. Then could you hand me -- I think you have two verdict forms. Could you hand me one verdict form, and then I will ask you to read aloud the verdict form on the counts to which the jury has reached unanimity.

And I'd like all the other jurors to listen carefully, because you will be polled, meaning Ms. Gumel is going to ask each one of you seat by seat whether you agree with the report made by your foreperson about the counts for which the jury has reached unanimity.

So please proceed.

JURY FOREPERSON: Just start with the counts?

THE COURT: Yes.

JURY FOREPERSON: Okay. Count 1, assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, 18 U.S.C. Section 111(a)(1), with respect to the offense of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, we, the members of the jury, unanimously find the defendant Vincent Gillespie guilty.

Go through all the charges?

THE COURT: Not all of them. Just the ones on which you've reached unanimity.

JURY FOREPERSON: Count 2, civil disorder. With respect to the offense of civil disorder, we, the members of the jury, unanimously find defendant Vincent Gillespie guilty.

Should I do the subparts?

THE COURT: Yes.

JURY FOREPERSON: On Count 2, we, the members of the jury, unanimously agree that the civil disorder -- oh, I'm sorry.

Count 2, we, the members of the jury, unanimously agree that the civil disorder obstructed, delayed, or adversely affected the conduct or performance of a federally protected function.

On Count 5, with respect to the offense engaging in physical violence in a restricted building or ground, we, the members of the jury, unanimously find the defendant Vincent Gillespie guilty.

On Count 7, act of physical violence in the Capitol grounds or buildings, with respect to the offense of act of physical violence in the Capitol grounds or buildings, we, the members of the jury, unanimously find defendant Vincent Gillespie guilty.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may take your seat.

Ms. Gumel, I will ask if you could please poll the jury.

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes, Your Honor.

Members of the jury, as each of your number is called, please indicate if your individual verdict is the same as that

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just announced. If it is, please answer yes. If it is not,
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      please answer no.
 3
           Juror number 2?
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                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 4?
 6
                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 5?
8
                JUROR: Yes.
 9
                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 6?
10
                JURY: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 7?
12
                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 8?
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                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 9?
16
                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 10?
18
                JUROR: Yes.
19
                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 11?
20
                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 12?
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                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: Juror number 13?
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                JUROR: Yes.
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                COURTROOM DEPUTY: And juror number 14?
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JUROR: Yes.

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polled.

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, the jury has been The verdict is unanimous.

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. Just in time for the Christmas weekend.

You have rendered good service to the community, and I know this has been a tough week, because a lot of people are already leaving town. A lot of people have been celebrating and having holiday parties, and you have been doing your civic duty by listening to this case, which is of importance to both sides in the case.

Since the poll verifies that the verdict is unanimous, I will direct the clerk to file and record the verdict.

I'm going to excuse you all now with great appreciation for your service, and I hope you all have safe travels, if you're traveling over the weekend, and are able to enjoy your holidays.

Thank you. You are all excused.

(Jury exited courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right. So I will declare a mistrial on Counts 3, 4, 6, and 8, since the jury was unable to reach a verdict on those.

And with respect to the next matters we have to deal with, I guess the government has to decide whether or not it wants to retry Mr. Gillespie on the counts for which a mistrial was declared.

And how much time will you need to make that determination? 1 2 MS. SCHESNOL: Your Honor, may I be given time to 3 confer with supervisors at the U.S. Attorney's Office? THE COURT: Of course. 4 5 MS. SCHESNOL: And if we do agree to retry on those 6 counts, we're ready. We can literally pick a jury January 3rd, 7 although I suspect we'll need some time to confer, and there 8 might even be some discussion about how a sentence on the 9 convictions, that might be a factor. So we will report back. 10 THE COURT: Right. So the question, are you prepared 11 to set a sentencing date now? 12 MS. SCHESNOL: Yes. 1.3 THE COURT: Okay. Good. That's of particular 14 importance. 15 COURTROOM DEPUTY: The jury is asking if they can talk 16 about the case now? 17 THE COURT: Yes, they can talk about the case now. 18 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Okay. I will tell them. 19 THE COURT: I would suggest a sentencing date about 90 20 days out. That would give you time --21 MR. WATKINS: Your Honor --22 THE COURT: Sorry. I will set a sentencing date about

90 days out. That will give the government time to decide

whether they want to retry Mr. Gillespie on the counts for which

a mistrial was declared, and if you do decide that, we might be

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able to get that trial done even before a sentencing date 90 days out.

So I would suggest if counsel could check their calendars for March 17th at 9:30 a.m.

MR. WATKINS: That's agreeable for the defendant.

MS. SCHESNOL: If we may have one moment.

Yes, March 17 works for the government. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Gumel is the important person to know about this to put it in the docket. We're going to set the sentencing for this case for March 17th at 9:30 a.m.

And I think the other matter to take up, then, is release or detention pending sentencing. Does the government have any objection to continuing the release conditions while

Mr. Gillespie is awaiting sentencing on the counts for which he has been convicted?

MS. SCHESNOL: Your Honor, he has been convicted for assaulting a federal officer, and for those reasons, we would seek detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3143.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WATKINS: Judge, we would ask that you maintain Mr. Gillespie on pretrial release. As the Court has seen from the Pretrial Services memo, his compliance on pretrial release has been impeccable. There's been no issues whatsoever. And he's been in close contact with his probation officer, because I've spoken with the probation officer as well about various

issues.

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He appeared here under his own power for the pretrial conference at no small expense and no small amount of energy. He drove down from Athol, once again, stayed in Maryland on his own dime again to come down here and appear for that hearing. He's been at all the Zoom hearings that the Court has scheduled. He came down again on his own dime and even early at my request, came down to Maryland to stay and prepare for the trial and has been here every day on time, as the Court has seen.

So in addition to that, of course, he is a long-time resident and he owns a home in Athol, Massachusetts. He really has no ties anywhere else. So this is not a case where there's really any kind of issue of risk of flight at this point.

I will tell the Court that we have had frank conversations about what the outcome here might be, and in fact, he has taken some steps, substantial steps, many substantial steps to get his affairs in order in the likelihood that he would be going to jail at some point here. That includes selling the house where he is, where he has, I think, put it on the market about a month ago, maybe three weeks, in somewhat of a difficult market right now, and he would like to be able to stay on and complete that so that there are not a lot of loose ends. As the Court has heard, he lives alone. He has very few people he can rely on to do the many tasks that are associated with that.

In addition, as the Court heard during his testimony, he is

trying to settle an aunt's estate as well in New Jersey, which also requires the sale of a home. So there are a lot of moving parts to his life.

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But he has heard the sentencing date, and I will reiterate to him that that will be the deadline for him to get all those affairs in order. So I don't think there's any real -- any risk of flight at this point.

As far as any kind of danger to community, again, the Court has seen Mr. Gillespie and had some -- and the Pretrial Services report. He's not a man with any kind of criminal history. Since that time, there have been no indications of any kind of criminal activity, let alone something that might indicate a risk of violence were the Court to continue him to the sentencing hearing.

With that, Your Honor, I would ask the Court to continue him on the current conditions.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I am going to continue Mr. Gillespie on his pretrial release conditions pending sentencing. I'm well aware under 18 U.S.C. 3143 that the standard is higher post-conviction, particularly of a crime involving assault of a police officer. But it did not involve a deadly weapon, and so this is not a 111(a)(1) and (b) crime that would raise the specter of basically almost required detention.

And so I look very carefully at a defendant's record from the date of offense conduct to the date of conviction at trial

to ascertain the risk to the community of a defendant staying out. And he hasn't engaged or incurred any other criminal justice interactions during that period, not just during the period after his arrest when he is on -- when he has been on pretrial supervision.

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So I will allow him to remain on pretrial release while awaiting sentencing.

I must caution you, as I'm sure you have, Mr. Watkins, Mr. Gillespie, about your behavior while you're on pretrial release. This is a particularly sensitive time for you. You must appear for sentencing on the date scheduled. If you don't, you can incur another criminal offense, and any sentence on that offense for not appearing as required could be piled on consecutive to any term of imprisonment you get for the convictions you've just incurred today.

If you don't appear and you don't comply with pretrial release conditions, you could also be subject to contempt of court, revocation of your release, and if you commit any new violations, new offense conduct while on release awaiting sentencing, that, too, can incur new criminal charges and enhanced penalties that are consecutive as opposed to just stand-alone.

So this is a sensitive time for you. So you will stay on the straight and narrow and deal with your -- the things that are concerning you on a day-to-day basis and not incur any new

offense conduct.

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Is there anything further from the defense?

MR. WATKINS: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything further from the government?

MS. SCHESNOL: Nothing further. We'll confer and then report back as quickly as possible regarding potential retrial.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you. Should I give you a date for that so we're all not sitting in limbo? I'm sure Mr. Gillespie and the defense team would like to know rather than just waiting around.

MS. SCHESNOL: I think that's a very good idea.

THE COURT: Yes. And I think it will be helpful for you when you're talking to your supervisors to know that I've set a date. So let's say January 6. And if you need more time, you will ask for more time, but I think January 6 is plenty of time.

> MS. SCHESNOL: Agreed. Thank you.

MR. WATKINS: Sorry. I didn't hear all of that. Is that a court event, or is that just a deadline by which the government --

I think the government by January 6 will THE COURT: file a notice with the Court of what their intent is with respect to Counts 3, 4, 6, and 8.

MS. SCHESNOL: We will do that. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. If there's nothing

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1	further, you're all excused.
2	(Proceedings adjourned at 2:19 p.m.)
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6	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
7	
8	I, Sara A. Wick, certify that the foregoing is a
9	correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
10	above-entitled matter.
11	
12	
13	/s/ Sara A. Wick February 13, 2023
14	SIGNATURE OF COURT REPORTER DATE
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